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TWO APPENDICES TO A DOCTORAL DISSERTATION: SOME NEW LIGHT ON THE ORIGIN OF KARL MARX' DISSOCIATION FROM BRUNO BAUER AND THE YOUNG HEGELIANS

L. BARONOVITCH

INTRODUCTION

A great deal has been written about the famous working relationship between Marx and Engels. Generally speaking, scholars have maintained that the birth of Marxism dates from the time when the two men met at the Cafe de la Régence in Paris during the summer of 1844. To some extent, this is true insofar as having discovered that they held many views in common, they decided to collaborate and develop their outlook, publishing wherever possible. Following this meeting, Marx, with some assistance from Engels, wrote two manuscripts crucially important in the history of the new materialism. The first of these was the publication of their shared viewpoint as a book which aimed to comprehensively dispose of Hegelian philosophy as represented in the work of Bruno Bauer and other 'Left' or 'Young' Hegelians. Having published *The Holy Family* in February 1845, Marx then decided to clarify his intellectual relationship to the humanist philosophy of Feuerbach, with whose views he had associated in his *Paris Manuscripts* of 1844, although by no means uncritically. Now, however, it was to be a different story. The First section of a set of manuscripts known today as *The German Ideology* were subdivided into sections on history and the production of consciousness and were directed mainly at Feuerbach. In these, Marx and Engels develop their whole philosophical perspective on ideology in a continual criticism of 'Left' Hegelian views, using this as a basis for expounding their perspective of historical materialism in the next section of the manuscript. The maturity of their viewpoint in both sections is quite remarkable, its trenchant style and uncompromising, thoroughly worked out position is of the kind which students associate with Marx' later economic writings. On the surface, therefore, it does seem clear that the new world view originated some time between 1844 and 1846. This line of thought, I suggest, lacks accuracy and subtlety. The manuscripts referred to above, I suggest, themselves express a culmination in the development of Marx' thinking which originated some five or six years earlier as a product of an intellectual collaboration of an entirely different kind, namely, that with Bruno Bauer.

The purpose of this paper is to show that Marxism owes as much to Marx' intellectual relationship with Bruno Bauer as it does to the later partnership with Engels. The seeds of historical materialism, I maintain, arrive in 1844 as an *antithesis* to the earlier friendship and thoroughgoing idealism of that period. It is the genesis of this antithesis that is the subject of this paper.

Marx first met Bauer at Berlin University through a mutual interest in Hegelian philosophy. Hegel had held the professorship of Philosophy at Berlin for thirteen years until his death in 1831 and by the middle of the 1830's, his views dominated the study of philosophy there. As a young student, his thought was greatly influenced by the intellectual spirit of the French Revolution, and the view that man's existence had its centre in his head, i.e. in *reason*, under whose inspiration he builds up the world of reality.¹ Under the impact of bourgeois humanitarianism and the spirit of 1789, Hegel had made the study of human consciousness and its historical progress his life's work. In his historical analysis of the cultural development of human consciousness, he gave human thought a genuine historical movement and a locus in real life. Advancing from Kant's static structuring of consciousness and morality, Hegel placed the responsibility for human action firmly inside the brain and traced the historical development of human reason in its process of advance from lower to higher forms of consciousness in his outstanding work, *Der Phänomenologie des Geistes*.² This great product of mind is an outcome of his earlier, more radical philosophical views that had undergone a somewhat theological evolution in the second decade of the 19th century.³

In his *Phänomenologie*, Hegel expressed the course of human history and culture as a reflection of the progressive development of human consciousness. In essence however, this work of maturity contained a fusion of the humanitarian outlook he had acquired in his youth with the impact of the reaction to the French Revolution in Europe and the Restoration in France. This fusion of the enlightened bourgeois consciousness with traditional elements of theology ultimately made religion the high point of human spiritual life and in the system of his philosophy, human consciousness was traduced by a theological reductionism to serve the guiding purpose of divine Spirit. From giving autonomy to the motion of mind in the historical development of civilisation, Hegel had ultimately chained it to the rock of theological premises, the most basic of which were the existence of God

and his divine control over earthly affairs. It is not surprising that it was particularly on questions of theology that divergent views appeared in the interpretation of Hegel's thought; by the time that Marx first became seriously involved with Hegel's thought in 1837 his school of philosophy had already begun to split into two opposed camps.

The debate that was to break up the unity of the Hegelian School in Germany opened in 1835 when D.F. Strauss published his *Life of Jesus*. Strauss argued that the gospel narrative of the life of Christ was essentially mythical and devoid of genuine historical content. His viewpoint touched directly on the raw nerve of interpreting the exact emphasis that Hegel had placed upon religion in his system and gained support from those who wished to separate philosophy entirely from religion. By 1837, Strauss himself used the terms Left and Right Hegelians to describe the rift and animosity within the movement that his work had created. It was into an arena of heated debate that Marx entered when he began attending meetings of the radical Left, or Young Hegelian Club at the University. Earlier, at Stralow, where during an illness he became acquainted with the works of Hegel "from beginning to end", he had set about achieving a self-clarification of his relationship to the master's thought by writing a 24 page dialogue on philosophy. He described his study, *Cleanthes, or the Starting Point and Necessary Progress of Philosophy*⁴ as comprising "a philosophical-dialectical account of divinity, as it manifests itself as the idea-in-itself as religion, as nature and as history", and having partially completed it, he returned to Berlin in an intellectual ferment. By the time he had written the last line of the dialogue, he had surrendered to the earthy charm of Hegel's philosophy, writing to his father that the last sentence of his work "was the beginning of the Hegelian system, and this work..... my dearest child reared by moonlight, like a false siren delivers me into the arms of the enemy".⁵

Having recovered from his dissonance, Marx had gained an introduction through newly acquired Hegelian friends to meetings of the University 'Doctors' Club', "which includes some university lecturers..... In controversy here, many conflicting views were expressed, and I became ever more firmly bound to the modern world philosophy from which I had thought to escape".⁶ This group, or club of critical and youthful philosophers formed the intellectual focus for radical theological and political discussion in Berlin at that time. It met regularly at a popular cafe where the contributions of post-graduates and young academics were read aloud and then subjected to criticism by a boisterous and liberal company, and where the main topic of discussion was Hegel's philosophy and the tenor of religious criticism comprehensively irreligious. The Young Hegelians of the Berlin club initially attacked the theological aspect of Hegel's system, but by 1840, they were to turn their attention to the wider aspects of his philosophy that had already received official recognition in the conservative circles of Prussian government. In this atmosphere, the young Marx breathed in the cut and thrust of debate around Hegel's system and soon became an active and leading member of the club. The history of the Young Hegelian movement and its leading personalities is well documented, as is Marx' intellectual relationship to the most prominent members of the Berlin group.⁷ These studies, however, are somewhat limited because they fail to analyse in any depth how the immediate course of his intellectual development was influenced by these relationships, especially those with his closest friends in the club, Karl Koeppen and Bruno Bauer.

Bruno Bauer had lectured in theology at Berlin University since 1834. As a student of the orthodox Hegelian, Marheinecke, he had led the attack on Strauss' book from the Right of the Hegelian movement. By 1837, however, his support for Hegel's theological philosophy had undergone a steady evolution, so that by the time Marx became an active member of the Berlin Club, Bauer was regarded as a leading spokesman of the Left Hegelians.⁸ Karl Koeppen taught history at a local school, and with Bauer, was particularly interested in the history of religion and classical philosophy. It was Bauer, however, who was primarily responsible for introducing a critical re-assessment of Hegel's theology and thought in general into the Young Hegelian movement between 1838 and the time that Marx left Berlin in 1841.⁹ This is not to undervalue the contribution of Ludwig Feuerbach, who published a number of interesting articles during this period, one of which critically examined the guiding concepts of Hegel's thought and added intellectual depth to the debate.¹⁰ Feuerbach, though, had become somewhat isolated from the Young Hegelians after 1838, but as I will show later on, his work during this period was not lost on Marx and is reflected in one of the Appendices that he wrote to his Doctoral Dissertation at the end of 1841.¹¹ The contributions of Bauer, on the other hand, were more immediately effective. His emphasis on the relationship between philosophy and history and his idea of the role of self-consciousness as a critical intellectual force decisively influenced the young Marx in his choice of topic for a doctoral dissertation.¹² Together with Koeppen's interest in post-Aristotelian philosophy, the themes developed by Bauer are all well represented in the first studies of philosophy that Marx made at this time, namely, the *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy* that he compiled as preliminary materials for his dissertation.

At the time that Marx wrote these notebooks on Greek and German philosophy, Koeppen was studying the relationship between Frederick the Great, the German Enlightenment and the post-Aristotelian philosophers while Bauer was preparing to take up the pen of Strauss and infuriate the orthodox Hegelians with an even more radical interpretation of the Gospels. In general, the Young Hegelians held that Christianity originated in a

Roman mind whose Spirit had emigrated from Greece in the form of the post-Aristotelian philosophies, especially Epicureanism, with its hatred of religious dogma and its self-conscious love of brotherhood. Koeppen was particularly interested in this relationship between Greek philosophy and Roman history insofar as he regarded these seeds of Christianity to be the intellectual roots of the German Enlightenment. In his book, *Friedrich der Grosse und seine Widersacher*, published in 1840 and dedicated to Marx, Koeppen argued that the greatness of the King of Prussia as leader of the Enlightenment originated in his expression of the post-Aristotelian systems with their content of republicanism, scepticism and hostility to theology.¹³

The relationship between Greek philosophy and the German Enlightenment, however, also had another side, which was to arouse the interest of Bruno Bauer. These post-Aristotelian systems had given way to Christianity during the Roman era and had been incorporated into the holy body as a passive, self-conscious love. Similarly, it seemed to Bauer that these systems which underpinned the German Enlightenment had given way to the Christian-German reaction and that the vitality of the later Greek spirit was contained within its intellectual expression, the Hegelian system, as a dormant force. It was no accident to the Young Hegelians that the master had undervalued these later Greek thinkers, as Marx was to note in the Foreword to his Dissertation.¹⁴ Bauer, in fact, took up Hegel's thesis of the ongoing development of mind precisely at the point where it had ended up in the *Phänomenologie*, that of a supreme self-consciousness. His major contribution to Hegelian philosophy was to revitalise the motion of mind by transposing self-consciousness from its passive role in the system of Hegel into a weapon of philosophical criticism with the aid of dialectics. Nowhere is the impact of Bauer's thought on this subject better expressed than in Karl Marx' *Doctoral Dissertation*, where Bauer's young friend endeavours to show again and again how the active self-consciousness of Epicurus enables him to overcome the inherent contradictions in his philosophy of nature when used by the ancient as a weapon of philosophical criticism.¹⁵

These questions of the relationship of German philosophy and culture to history, and particularly the connection between Hegelian philosophy and the post-Aristotelian systems, had a special, *personal* meaning for the Young Hegelians. Just as they believed that the subsuming of Enlightenment post-Aristotelian vitality paralleled its earlier subsuming into Roman Christianity, they also believed that their intellectual relationship to Hegel and his system similarly paralleled the relationship of the post-Aristotelians to the *total* philosophy of that earlier master, Aristotle.¹⁶ This belief was supported by Bruno Bauer's understanding of the historical and philosophical connection between Aristotelian philosophy, the systems that followed it and their disappearance, at its highest stage of development, self-consciousness, into an oddly coincidental Christian State of Prussia. The Young Hegelians viewed their rescue of self-consciousness from Hegel and its restoration as a critical weapon of philosophy as paralleling the revitalisation of philosophy by the Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics after the complete and encompassing system of Aristotle. The most concise and brilliant considerations on all the questions of history and philosophy were expressed by Marx at that time in his *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy* and in the Appendices he added to his *Doctoral Dissertation* two years later.

ABSTRACT AND REAL POSSIBILITY: THE PRACTICAL EVOLUTION OF PHILOSOPHY

Between 1838 and the end of 1841, the young Marx wrote three exceedingly interesting pieces of philosophy which have only recently come to occupy the attention of scholars. The first two, the *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy* that Marx wrote as preparatory studies for a doctoral dissertation, and the dissertation itself are works which examine Greek materialist philosophy in a highly original and most challenging way.¹⁷ The preparatory notebooks, however, also contain a short section dealing with the history of philosophy and the position of Hegel's system in this history.¹⁸ Generally speaking though, up to 1841, Marx was thoroughly occupied in writing philosophy, the object of which was to show that the famous declination principle of Epicurean natural philosophy was a reflection of a general principle of self-consciousness acting throughout the entire system of the Greek's thought.

At the end of 1841, Marx again took up the question of clarifying his intellectual relationship to Hegelian philosophy in two lengthy Notes that he appended to his *Doctoral Dissertation*. In the first of these, he returned to the theme he had developed two years earlier in his Sixth Notebook on Epicurean Philosophy, in which he discussed the process whereby philosophy attained a practical expression in the external world. The worldly expression of philosophy, he now maintained, had two sides, one, an *objective* relationship of thought to the world. The second, "the relation of the philosophical system which is actualised to its intellectual supporters and to the individual self-consciousness in which its progress becomes manifest".¹⁹ This second, *subjective* aspect has a further quality, said Marx, to do with the attempt of the philosopher to convey his thought to the world. Earlier, in the Epicurean Notebook referred to above, he had noted that when a system of philosophy achieved a *totality*, having expanded to be the whole world, it turned against the world of appearance. The world confronting such a total philosophy, he had said, was a world torn apart and the activity of the philosopher

contradictory. He developed this theme in the Note that he appended to his Doctoral Dissertation, observing that in the attempt of the philosopher to make the world philosophical, the realisation of his philosophy also became its loss as his intellectual activity became worldly and practical, and as such, fell into the same defects as those it sought to fight in the opposite camp.²⁰

Therefore in this discussion of these objective and subjective sides in the historical evolution of philosophy, Marx, with particular reference to the evolution of Hegel's system, is concerned to develop a distinct theme..... namely, how the objective universality of a total system, "is turned back into the subjective forms of individual consciousness in which it has life". In other words, how the practical, worldly expression of the master's thought evolved in the Hegelian school which followed it. At the same time, however, Marx is also interested in how the followers of Hegel interpret the master's thought within individual consciousness and attempt, in the fashion of Hegel himself, to place their interpretation on the world. As we shall see, any surmise that Marx may have had Bruno Bauer in mind in this Appended Note is indeed correct.

As I had pointed out earlier on, by 1841, the post-Hegelian world of German philosophy was already torn apart, divided into two camps by the duality of the Hegelian philosophical mind and intellectual activity, a totality "torn apart and contradictory". This duality produced two subjective forms of individual consciousness which, in Marx' opinion, both retained at that time the spiritual monas of Hegel's system. These subjective forms expressed Hegelian thought objectively in two opposing schools of philosophy and are described by Marx in the first Note that he appended to his *Doctoral Dissertation* as the *liberal party* and the party, or school of *positive philosophy*. Their worldly evolution was to play a key role in Marx' intellectual development from 1841 onwards, but the context within which Marx wrote about them has never been correctly understood by commentators. In the end, he says,

"this duality of the philosophical mind produces two schools²¹ completely opposed to one another, one of which, the liberal party as we may loosely call it, lays most emphasis on philosophy as a concept and principle, while the other holds fast to what are not concepts, to the real. This second school is positive philosophy.²² The activity of the first takes the form of a critique i.e. philosophy turning itself against the exterior world, the activity of the latter is an attempt to philosophise i.e. philosophical introspection. The second school sees the deficiency as immanent to philosophy, whereas the first sees it as a deficiency of the world that it is trying to make philosophical. Each of these parties does exactly what the other aims at and what it does not itself intend. But the first, in spite of its inner contradictions, is in general aware of its principle and aim. In the second, the inversion, the craziness so to speak, is manifested in all its purity. As regards content, it is only the liberal party, because it is the party of the concept, which makes any real progress, whereas positive philosophy is only capable of requirements and tendencies whose form contradicts their meaning.

Thus what first appears as an inverted relationship and an inimical rift between philosophy and the world becomes secondly a rift within the individual philosopher's mind and appears finally as an exterior division and duplication within philosophy as two opposed philosophical schools.....

As far as the schools themselves are concerned, I will fully explain in another place both their relationship to each other, to the Hegelian philosophy and to the individual historical stages that represent this development."

Marx never did fully explain these relationships in any one specific work. But as is clearly evident from the section of the appended Note on Hegelian Philosophy already quoted, his intellectual sympathies in 1841 were with the *liberal party*, the Young Hegelians grouped around Bruno Bauer. Only they could make "any real progress" "because it is the party of the concept" "whose activity takes the form of a critique i.e. philosophy turns against the exterior world". By the end of 1843, however, and probably earlier²³ Marx' attitude to *self-consciousness* and Bauer's Criticism had changed. In his article, *Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*²⁴ he again discussed the evolution of the Hegelian school. Now, however, he spoke of a division within the left of the Hegelian movement and one that had become sharply defined and could be described as a division between parties. Marx' view at the end of 1843 was that,

"German philosophy of right and the state is the only German history that is *al pari* with modern times..... the German nation is obliged to connect its dream history with its present circumstances, and subject to criticism not only these circumstances but also their abstract continuation. Its future can be restricted neither to the direct negation of its real, nor to the direct fulfilment of its ideal political and juridical circumstances; for the direct negation of its real circumstances is already there in its ideal circumstances, and it has almost outlived the direct fulfilment of these in its contemplation of neighboring nations."

That is why, says Marx,

"The practical political party is right, therefore, in demanding the negation of philosophy. Its error lies not in the demand, but in limiting itself to the demand which it neither does nor can fulfill. It believes that it can achieve this negation by turning its back on philosophy..... In its narrow outlook it does not even count philosophy a part of German actuality, or it considers philosophy to be beneath the level of German practical life..... You [of the practical party] demand that the actual germs of life be the point of departure, but you forget that the German nation's actual germs of life have until now sprouted only in its cranium. In short, you cannot transcend philosophy without actualising it."

Of the theoretical political party, "which originated in philosophy",

"This party saw in the present struggle only the critical struggle of philosophy against the German world..... Critical of its counterpart, it remained uncritical of itself. it either accepted the conclusions reached by philosophy or else presented as directly

philosophical demands and results drawn from elsewhere..... Its basic defect reduces to this: it believed that it could actualise philosophy without transcending it."²⁵

Marx even declares his intention to write the kind of work *The Holy Family* was to be when he says of this group, "we reserve until later a fuller account of this party".

In his biography of Marx, David McLellan, referring to the situation of German philosophy of the 1840's, said that Marx clarified his own position with regard to German philosophy, "by pointing to two different attitudes both of which seemed to him to be inadequate. The first, which in some respects recalled the views of Feuerbach, Marx called the 'practical political party'. The second attitude, characteristic of the theoretical party — by which Marx meant Bruno Bauer and his followers....." McLellan is correct in pointing to Marx' characterisation of Feuerbach's viewpoint, but what he has failed to see is that *the theoretical party of 1843 was the evolved, worldly form of the liberal party or school of 1841 which "lays most emphasis on philosophy as a concept and principle"*. By 1843 Bauer's group of liberal philosophers had developed into the *theoretical political party of the critical struggle*.

In 1841, Marx held that the liberal school put most emphasis on philosophy as a concept and principle. Its philosophical activity consisted of criticism of the exterior world which it considered deficient in philosophy and which it was concerned to make philosophical; its motion was therefore directed against the world. By 1843/4, Marx had characterised the major activity of this tendency as purely theoretical; the theoretical party had as its sole aim the critical struggle of philosophy against all the conditions of the German world. But in the *struggle* of the radical Young Hegelian group against the social conditions of the Prussian police state, this activity of Bauer's liberal school remained within the realm of theory. To moustache and musket, Bauer and his followers opposed the salvos of *Canonic Criticism*. Against bayonet and sabre, Bauer unleashed himself as Criticism incarnate,the Word, the Way and the Life..... the conscience of history deified as self-consciousness. From the lecture theatre at Berlin, his 1840 performances as a radical and atheist had evolved so far that by 1843, he had progressed sufficiently to perform on the boards as the holy father.²⁸ Marx had anticipated his attitude to Bauer's theoretical party of 1843 and its vision which "saw in the present struggle nothing but the critical struggle of philosophy" of the concept, "with the German world" in the preliminary notes he wrote for his Doctoral Dissertation in 1839. Discussing the role of the wise man in the history of Greek philosophy, he had said, and with reference to post-Socratic philosophy, that philosophy proper had attained its own existence in consciousness as consciousness itself, but as a consequence, the former unity of consciousness with worldly substance had been destroyed.²⁹ The real aptness of this idea is fully brought out in *The Holy Family*, written during 1844, where Marx says, "On one side stands the Mass, that material, passive, dull and unhistorical element of history. On the other side stand the Spirit, Criticism, Herr Bruno and Co." "He [Bauer] consciously plays the part of the World Spirit in opposition to the mass of the rest of mankind" and, "the relation between spirit and mass has still a hidden sense which will be completely revealed in the course of the reasoning". The relation discovered by Bauer, said Marx, was

"nothing but a Critically caricatural realisation of Hegel's conception of history; this in turn, is nothing but the *speculative* expression of the *Christian-Germanic* dogma of the opposition between *spirit* and *matter*, between *God* and the *world*."³⁰

But in his Epicurean Notebooks of 1838, Marx had already formulated his assessment of the consequence of such a separation of philosophy, Spirit, from the World, when he said of both the Greek sage and Hegel, inasmuch as the wise man,

"pronounces the judgement of the concept on the world, he is in himself divided and judged; for while he has his roots for one part in the substantial, he owes his right to exist only in the laws of the state to which he belongs, to its religion, in brief, to all the substantial conditions which appear to him as his own nature."³¹

Like Hegel's pronouncement of judgement on the world in the shape of the World Spirit, so Bauer's judgement of Criticism on the world created the conditions, or rather, heralded his radical dissolution as a Hegelian radical into a speculative theologian, or at any rate, into the nationalist-liberal he became later on in his political association with Bismarck's agents. From hindsight, in 1844, Marx claimed that Bauer had always been a speculative theologian and orthodox Hegelian.³² Nonetheless, his association with Bauer was not to become severely strained until 1843. His remarks therefore confirm that while his judgement of Hegel between 1841 and mid 1843 was sophisticated, his intellectual development still remained within the confines of liberal-theoretical activity.

Yet within the walls of uncritical friendship, internal developments were taking place which were to expose Marx to the external influence of Feuerbach and the progress the latter had made as a serious critic of Hegel's philosophy. This exposure, in turn, produced the development in Marx' thinking which enabled him in the summer of 1843 to take up a critical attitude to Bauer, and for the first time, on a question of practical political consequence, *Die Judenfrage*. Marx' first general expression of his philosophical relationship and attitude to Bauer, however, was uncritical if only because he too, supported the role of critical philosophy in 1841.

By the summer of 1843, Marx had had the opportunity to read Feuerbach's *Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie* published in February of that year, and his *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* which appeared in July. He had also read Feuerbach's critical assessment of Hegel's philosophy which had been published by Ruge in 1839³³ as well as the by then famous *Das Wesen des Christentums* and was now strongly influenced by his thought. While Feuerbach's influence on Marx' intellectual development is certainly important, it has often been misunderstood. Even from the time he had first read Feuerbach's seminal *Thesen*, which struck right at the heart of Hegel's whole metaphysics, he found him unconcerned with practical questions of life. His criticism of Feuerbach in his letter to Ruge of March 1843³⁴ foreshadows the opinion of his *Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* where he had pointed out that, "you cannot transcend philosophy without actualising it" i.e. without making it practical. Philosophy could only be transcended through the medium of politics, for in 1843, politics in Germany, Marx maintained, was the sole means by which the advanced thinking of German philosophy could transform the social conditions of German life. Feuerbach, on the other hand, had stated in a letter to Ruge, also written in 1843, that "Quiet influence is the best..... we have not yet arrived at the point of transition from theory to practice".³⁵ All this evidence reinforces the view that Marx' comment vis-à-vis the practical party was directed at Feuerbach, a view itself reinforced by the events of Feuerbach's life, for when Marx said, "they believe they can complete that negation by turning their backs on philosophy" who else could he have referred to but Feuerbach? Feuerbach..... whose *Thesen* and *Grundsätze* had initiated a major attack on Hegel's philosophy in 1843, but who had himself abandoned practical affairs in order to rediscover "the science of optics" by studying, through the evidence of his senses, particularly his eyes, the *simple* life on a farm deep in the German countryside.³⁶ Therefore despite the volumes written about a Feuerbachian Marx of 1844, I would argue that Marx had a dual relationship to his thought. Essentially, Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel's philosophy was important because it laid bare the philosophical process by which Hegel's thought rationalised the political forms of the Prussian State.... making a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right possible. Feuerbach's work provided Marx with a way forward for a genuine criticism of German political conditions and a way out of the Young Hegelian critical impasse that limited action to the realm of mental activity. Secondly, by inverting Hegel, Feuerbach directed Marx' attention to the *real* activities of human beings in society. Nonetheless, the theoretical value of Feuerbach to Marx was balanced by his practical value, and Marx, I think, was under no illusion about the practical value of Feuerbach for very long. Evidence shows a real divergence in the lives of the two men of a fundamental character. Feuerbach retired to a quiet scholarly life on a German farm while still young. Marx, on the other hand, was an experienced political journalist by the time he was twenty five. His comments in his article of 1843, indicating his attitude towards both Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians still around Bauer, provide an excellent insight into the direction in which his thoughts had progressed when contrasted with his earlier opinion on this subject, which, in the case of Bauer, he had made clear in 1841.

FROM ABSTRACT TO REAL POSSIBILITY: POSSIBILITY AS WORLDLY PRACTICE

During the year 1842, Marx had served a political apprenticeship in radical journalism, formulating political opinions about social questions while influenced both by the activity and voice of conservative authority and by the revolutionary and philosophically critical opinions of men like Hess, Bauer and Feuerbach. His dissociation from Bruno Bauer began from the time he became seriously involved in the journalism of the *Rheinische Zeitung* in Cologne. While Bauer had returned to Berlin to associate himself with the violent clamour in the liberal press against the authorities, Marx had found a source of income, new friends and a congenial occupation, in a word, an environment which contrasted strongly with the Left Hegelian *criticism* of 1841. This other group of Hegelian Left, says Cornu, referring to men like Hess and Ruge, "was going exactly in the opposite direction, striving to unite thought more closely to reality, to tie theory to action. They turned from the conservative bourgeoisie to the revolutionary class, the proletariat, and went from liberalism to communism".³⁷ This movement from liberalism to communism might have been true for Hess, but it was not true for Marx. The period of Marx' association with the *Rheinische Zeitung* is one in which he changed from a support of worldly directed scholastic criticism into a radical political journalist with a social conscience and a political consciousness of a radical order. Further, it was during this development as a radical critic that he began to formulate a critical intellectual opposition of viewpoint to the ideas of Bauer and associate more with the revolutionary thinking of Hess.

The change of direction in Marx' political consciousness in the second half of 1842 may have been radical, but its speed was slow when contrasted to the pace of Hess' conversion to communism. This fact is highlighted by the odd dualism of his relationship to Bauer as late as the spring of 1843 and evident from his letter to Ruge of that time. While he praised Bauer's writing in his self-defence in glowing terms, he nonetheless criticised his attitude to Jews, but in a muted tone. Referring to a Jewish petition for civil liberties, Marx noted that "Although I find the Israelite faith repugnant, yet Bauer's opinion seems to me to be too abstract". Although muted, Marx' opinion of Bauer is clearly critical. That he did adopt a critical attitude to the way in which his closest friend had dealt with this social question reflects both his association with different more radical views than those of Bauer,

but above all else, the fact that he held these ideas to represent a closer relationship to reality than the “abstract” thinking of his Berlin friend.

Two major facts stand out in the course of Marx’ intellectual development during the year 1842. Firstly, the beginning of his political life as a radical journalist and his association with radical opinion; secondly, his detachment from the influence of Bauer and growing dissociation from Bauer’s unworldly scholasticism. *Paradoxically, the origin of this break with Bauer begins at the very point where Marx had supported the theoretical party in the Appendix to his Doctoral Dissertation.* Yet it was logical that what became apparent as a divergence in their philosophical attitude to the world should manifest itself exactly where their practical activities also began to separate.

In common with Bauer, Marx initially believed that the course of history could only be determined by the elimination of its irrational elements through self-conscious criticism. Unlike Bauer, however, and more true to Hegel’s fundamental conception, according to Cornu,³⁸ Marx denied that the Spirit had any absolute power to change the world at will. In this respect, Marx introduced one of the Appendices to his Doctoral Dissertation by charging Hegel’s critical followers with passing moral judgement on his philosophy while remaining “fervent adherents to all aspects of its one-sidedness”. In 1841, Marx had tried to demonstrate the hollowness of the Spirit’s power in the Second Appendix to his Dissertation in which he examined the relationship of man to God.³⁹ In a comment on Plutarch’s theology, Marx attacked the idealist notion of formal possibility, opposing the idea that anything could exist (even God, if a godly existence did not contradict formal logic), with the conditions limiting existence in the real world. By opposing formal possibility with real possibility, i.e. real conditions, he endeavoured to link thought to real existence and therefore directed the search for truth to the facts of concrete reality. This being so, it was logical that he should have increasingly denied any intrinsic value to speculative philosophy beyond purely mental activity. Philosophy had either to end with *mind* or enter the world as *will*, as a practical activity such as the criticism of real conditions..... as with Bauer’s party of theory. Marx supported this turning of philosophy against the world in his friend’s *criticism* and his support for the idea of criticism is clear from the Appended Note to his dissertation. Yet at the same time, by opposing the formal possibility of the existence of God with real conditions, he proposed that rational truth lay in fact, in *real* rather than in *ideal* existence.

This *essence* of Marx’ break with Bauer, I maintain, was fostered by his early career in journalism. During this period, he realised that the entry of philosophy into the world as intellectual criticism resulted in activity that either became practical or remained theoretical. From the practice of political journalism and the struggle it entailed in Prussia at that time, *Marx came to hold the view that critical intellectual activity had of necessity to become practical, political goals could only be achieved through a social intercourse with real conditions, with life. With Bauer, on the other hand, criticism remained limited to an activity of mind, an activity of philosophy, of the Content, of Spirit; he could go no further than thought.* Marx later expressed this kind of view of Bauer in *The Holy Family*, showing that his early criticism of Hegel was hollow. He accused Bauer of being a representative of Hegelian orthodoxy. The relation between spirit and non-spirit “discovered by Herr Bruno” was simply a caricature by Bauer of Hegel’s conception of history.⁴⁰ Bauer, he declared, considered himself to be *the* representative of philosophy. Clearly, though, if Bauer, as a leader of *left* Hegelianism, was the human form of philosophy, was estranged man, Marx’ entry into the practical affairs of political journalism would have led him to abandon both scholastic philosophy and Bruno Bauer, and this was indeed the case.

The above argument is supported by a fact that has failed to receive comment from students of this period of Marx’ life. I have suggested that the first sign of Marx’ theoretical movement from the position of Bauer appears in the viewpoint of his Second Appended Note, that on Plutarch, i.e. in the idea that rational truth lies in reality rather than in abstraction. It is an interesting fact, however, that Marx *expressed an entirely contrary opinion two years earlier when writing the preliminary Epicurean Notebooks for his Doctoral Dissertation, and, moreover, at a time when he was much influenced by the ideas of Bauer.* Discussing the Epicurean notion of the composite world in his First Notebook, he commented that,

“It must be noted that the soul perishes, that it owes its existence only to accidental admixture, expresses in general the accidental nature of all these notions e.g. soul, which not being necessary in ordinary consciousness are accounted for by Epicurus as accidental conditions which are seen as something given, the necessity of which,..... is not only not proved, but is even admitted to be not provable, not possible. What persists, on the other hand is the freedom of the imagination.”

Thus,

“what is lasting and great in Epicurus is that he gives no preference to conditions over notions and tries just as little to save them. For Epicurus, the task of philosophy is to prove that the world and thought are thinkable and possible. His proof and the principle by which it proceeds and to which it is referred is again possibility existing for itself.”⁴¹

i.e. abstract or formal possibility. Apart from the obvious support that Marx gave to Epicurus in his dissertation and preliminary studies, the above position is the *exact opposite* of his thought in the *Appended Note on Plutarch*. In both his dissertation and its preliminary materials, Marx supported the freedom of Epicurean self-

consciousness over real conditions, the *real possibility* of the *material* Democritean atom, giving no preference to conditions over notions and consequently supporting the freedom of mind to speculate and criticise. *This viewpoint was the philosophical position of Bruno Bauer between 1838 and 1841.* Self-consciousness as the freedom of critical theory could change the world at will; the free Spirit of criticism overcame contradiction entirely unhindered by real conditions. By the time that he had added the *Appended Note on Plutarch* to his dissertation at the end of 1841, *Marx had reversed his position*, now attacking the notion of formal or *abstract possibility* and suggesting that rational truth lay in fact rather than in imagination or self-consciousness.

Yet if Marx had come from a support of *abstract possibility* in 1839 to a support for *real possibility* and existing conditions at the end of 1841, his new point of view remained vague. It lacked the backing of a positive philosophy based on real conditions. Immersed in theory, he came to understand the importance of fact and real conditions, but could not support a philosophy based on real conditions because it contradicted his support for the critical philosophy of Bauer. At the end of 1841, Marx held that activity, of necessity, had to remain limited to criticism, a criticism directed at real conditions rather than theory. At the end of 1841 and by the beginning of 1842, however, he came to abandon theory as pure criticism for itself and emphasized that theory had to become practically directed *against* real conditions. If the philosophy, the positive philosophy or real conditions had not been fully spelled out in 1841, its basis existed in the critical and religious writings of Feuerbach and received complete expression in his criticism and inversion of Hegel a year later. On publication in the first half of 1843, Feuerbach's positive philosophy of man had a pronounced effect on Marx' thought and finally detached him once and for all from the influence of his first comrade of the intellect, Bruno Bauer. As for Bauer, Lobkowitz correctly comments that, "inasmuch as he understood that the world was not willing to change in response to words alone, Bauer was unable to follow Marx who concluded that critical activity had to materialise as political action. Instead he fell back on an ever more radical interpretation of his own endeavour" and, "eventually retired into a splendid isolation of scorn and contempt from which he opposed everybody and everything".⁴²

CONCLUSION

In his attack on Bauer and his thought in *The Holy Family*, Marx analysed this "splendid isolation" in detail. In 1840, said Marx, Bauer had turned the role of philosophy into a critical mission against the world; by 1843, Bauer's philosophy had evolved into a *party* of Critical theory and by 1844, into a *party* of Critical Criticism, complete with a band of disciples and a spiritual leader.⁴³ It is no coincidence that Marx wrote *The Holy Family* soon after he had completed writing the section of his *Paris Manuscripts* entitled *Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole*. This important critique summarised the relationship of the thought of both Bauer and Feuerbach to Hegel's philosophy and then analysed the positive and negative sides of Hegel's dialectic, stressing, especially, Hegel's positive understanding of the role of labour and the weaknesses that Hegel's standpoint contained.⁴⁴ This final section of Marx' manuscripts is *the* genuine nodal point of his intellectual development from 1837 to 1846, for it was preceded by his first championship of the proletariat at the end of 1843, his immersion in the economic conditions of French society when he moved to Paris in the first quarter of 1844 and his critique of political economy in the manuscripts he wrote from the Spring of that same year. The essence of Marx' interest in the proletariat and political economy lay in the potentiality of these forces to become real agents of social change, active hostile critics of *real* conditions. This theme of changing real conditions underlies Marx' critique of Hegelian philosophy and is continued by him in *The Holy Family* where he showed how Bauer's hostile attitude to the mass, the proletariat, originated in his uncritical attitude to Hegel's dialectic. This attitude, said Marx, placed him in the position of following the weaknesses of Hegel's interpretation of the role of labour, i.e. Hegel's estranged understanding of labour as an alienation, as consciousness, and appeared in his own thought and life as an estrangement from the masses, an abstract relationship to the masses, an isolation from them which led him to a contemptuous and hostile attitude.

The highest point that Hegel had reached in his analysis of the development of mind was that of self-consciousness. In the hands of Bauer, Hegelian self-consciousness entered the world as *criticism*, its entire subject being a criticism of the objective world. Bauer began his academic career as a theological critic when he attacked Strauss' view of God as substance; certitude of the nature of God, Bauer maintained, could only be achieved by self-consciousness. Instead of saying that Strauss' understanding of religious tradition and "the power of the community" had its abstract expression in Spinoza's conception of substance,⁴⁵ Bauer, said Marx, preferred to take abstractions from reality and vitalise them as definite forms of existence, bringing abstract categories to empirical life with the aid of Hegel's "miracle apparatus".⁴⁶ Bauer's viewpoint that philosophy is expected to "open up the compact solidity of Substance" and bring it to self-consciousness accorded in Marx' opinion with Hegel's own criticism of substantiality.⁴⁷ In essence, said Marx, Bauer's self-consciousness is abstracted substance,

“transformed from an *attribute* of *man* into a *self-existing object*. This is the *metaphysical-theological* caricature of man in his *severance* from nature. The *being* of this self-consciousness is therefore not *man* but the *idea* of which self-consciousness is the real existence”.⁴⁸

It is the *idea* because *man* and man’s real existence, his activities and qualities become travestied as an end product, a result of self-consciousness. Bauer’s “speculative idealism” said Marx, “substitutes *self-consciousness* or *the spirit* for the real individual man” “What we are combating in Bauer’s criticism is precisely *speculation* reproducing itself as a caricature”...⁴⁹ “a Critically caricatural consummation of Hegel’s conception of History”.

Hegel’s idea of history is of the development of Absolute Spirit within the progress of real empirical history. The role of mankind in this development is reduced to a passive mass, bearing a “varying degree of consciousness or unconsciousness” and the Absolute Spirit treats this mass as passive material that can be developed and moulded. But according to Hegel, only through philosophy is the Absolute Spirit able to attain a consciousness of its historically formative activities and hence a true consciousness of itself. Marx repeats his earlier criticism of Hegel when he points out that the weaknesses of his view of history are that his conception substitutes an *idea* of real, historical man for the *empirically real* man. Further, the history it *makes* only exists as an act of consciousness in the speculative imagination of the philosopher. What *Bauer* does, says Marx, is to eliminate Hegel’s inconsistencies by proclaiming “Criticism to be the Absolute Spirit and *himself* to be *Criticism*.”⁵⁰ Criticism consequently regards the mass, mankind, as a passive entity without will or purpose, with only a varying degree of consciousness. It fails to see that human beings exist empirically as thinking, acting men and women with needs and purpose. Furthermore, in his attempt to make his particular ‘philosophy’ worldly and consequently, render the world philosophical, Bauer, Marx pointed out, endeavoured to harmonise Hegel’s abstract, Absolute Spirit in his own person and play the part of Critical philosophy turned against the world; the Spirit of Criticism, critical of the Spirit of the people. Marx had correctly foreseen this evolution of Hegelian philosophy in the first Note he had appended to his Doctoral Dissertation in 1841, but could not have known then that the evolution would have occurred in the person of Bruno Bauer, his friend and intellectual collaborator of that year.

With Bauer, then, Hegel’s conception of history had departed from the mind of the philosopher as mere speculation and had entered into the real world. This entrance, however, was still that of philosophical, speculative mind, oriented towards, but necessarily opposed to empirical reality; opposed to reality because its task, as speculative philosophy, was to render this empirical reality speculative. In order to make the world philosophical, Bauer needed to invert empirical reality as Hegel had done earlier. *Bauer’s role, therefore, as Absolute Criticism incarnate, was to direct philosophy, i.e. Absolute Criticism, against the world in order to ensure the return of the real empirical world to philosophy.*

The metamorphosis of Hegel’s philosophy in the hands of Bauer began in 1840. Starting in that year as a weapon of philosophical criticism, the challenge of theory to worldly conditions, by 1844, it had advanced to a critical force ranged against the entire world. In the first Note that he appended to his Doctoral Dissertation at the beginning of 1841, Marx had supported Bauer when commenting on the break-up of the Hegelian school of philosophy. One result of this, he said, was the creation of a *party of theory* the activity of which was to turn philosophy “against the exterior world”. It was only this party, said Marx, “which makes any real progress, because it is the party of the concept”. Marx had supported Bauer and the party of theory, or the concept, in 1841, because together with Bauer, he then believed that philosophy could combat the deficiency of the world through theoretical criticism. Both gave primacy to theory, or *abstract possibility* over *real circumstances* or *formal possibility*. By the end of 1841, however, Marx’ viewpoint had undergone a profound change in the second Note that he appended to his Dissertation, exactly at the time when he began his career as a political journalist. This emphasis now on the primacy of circumstance over speculation, the shift from abstract to real possibility, is the source of Marx’ intellectual movement from his support for Bauer’s view in the period 1839-1841 to a critique of all the circumstances of real possibility in 1844. By this time, he had abandoned theoretical possibility offered by intellectual criticism for criticism afforded by concrete economic and social circumstance. At the same time, he had ceased to be a scholastic entity and had become a worldly individual, indeed, and with a world to win.

NOTES

¹ See G. Lukács *The Young Hegel*, Trans. R. Livingstone London 1975.

² G.W.F. Hegel *The Phenomenology of Mind* Trans. J.B. Baillie London 1931.

³ See also H. Marcuse *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* London 1968. See also the translator’s *Introduction* to L. Feuerbach *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* M.H. Vogel Indianapolis 1966.

⁴ The manuscript of this Dialogue is not extant.

⁵ This and the above quotations are contained in the letter that Karl Marx wrote to his father, Heinrich Marx in 1837, contained in *Marx-Engels Collected Works* English translation Vol. 1. p. 11. Lawrence & Wishart London 1975. From now on reference to this series will be *Collected Works (English)*.

⁶ Karl Marx to Heinrich Marx *ibid*.

⁷ Two competent studies of this subject are those by A. Cornu, *Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels: leur Vie et leur Ouvre* 4 Vols. Paris 1955 and D. McLellan *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx* London 1969.

⁸ See D. McLellan *op. cit.* p. 226.

⁹ For an excellent short discussion of Bruno Bauer see D. McLellan *op. cit.* pp. 48-49. ¹⁰ This was published on 30th August 1839 in A. Ruge *Hallische Jahrbucher*. See Note 35 below.

¹¹ The influence of Feuerbach's articles on Marx in 1841 has been a subject of some debate. See footnote 24 below.

¹² D. McLellan *op. cit.* pp. 59-63 and 69-73.

¹³ Commenting on the relationship of the post-Aristotelian systems to the history of Greek philosophy in the Foreword to his Dissertation, Marx noted that, "a more profound indication of their connection with Greek life can be found in the essay of my friend Koeppen". This refers to the passage in Koeppen's book...."Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism are the nerve muscles and intestinal system of the antique organism, whose immediate, natural unity conditioned the beauty and morality of antiquity and which disintegrated with the decay of the latter". See C.F. Koeppen *Friedrich der Grosse und Seine Widersacher* Berlin 1840.

¹⁴ Lenin expresses a similar point of view in his *Philosophical Notebooks* pp. 291-297 in *Collected Works* Vol. 38 London 1961.

¹⁵ Marx expresses this in its most general form in the final paragraph of his *Doctoral Dissertation*. See *Collected Works (English)* Vol. I p. 73.

¹⁶ See the Introduction by J.M. Gabaude to *Le jeune Marx et la Materialisme Antique* Toulouse 1971.

¹⁷ For a discussion of the importance of Karl Marx' *Doctoral Dissertation* and his preparatory studies for it, the *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy* see L. Baronovitch, Marx, Hegel and Greek Philosophy: A New Approach to the Subject of Karl Marx' Early Intellectual Development in *The Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy* Vol. VII No. 2 Oberlin U.S.A. May 1976. See also C. Baily *Review of Marx Doctoral Dissertation* in *Classical Quarterly* xxii (1928) pp. 205-206.

¹⁸ See Notebook 2 to end of Notebook 4, a critique of Plutarch's evaluation of Epicurean philosophy, and Notebook 6. *Collected Works (English)* Vol. 1.

¹⁹ The editors of *Collected Works (English)* Vol. 1 have placed the first Note that Marx appended to his Dissertation under the heading *IV. General Difference in Principle Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* p. 84. In my opinion, the section should be regarded as a Note on Hegelian Philosophy in General.

²⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 85-86.

²¹ The translators of Vol. I have used the word 'trends' whereas the translation of McLellan in *Karl Marx: Early Texts* *op. cit.* p. 16 uses the word 'schools'. I have used McLellan's translation as it seems to me to be more positive and in keeping with the article whose purpose was to examine the process by which philosophy develops.

²² There has been considerable debate as to what Marx meant by the 'school of positive philosophy'. Lobkowicz suggests that Marx is referring to the school of German positive philosophy which interpreted Hegel's thought from a rightist standpoint. It is an interesting fact that positive philosophy was critically assessed by Feuerbach in the article he wrote for Ruge's *Hallische Jahrbucher* in December 1838, *Zur Kritik der "positiven Philosophie"*. If Marx did indeed critically refer to a German school of positive philosophy, then it would seem that he was influenced by Feuerbach's article. It could also be argued that the critical attitude he adopted towards positive philosophy does not reflect this article in particular. When Marx used the phrase 'school of positive philosophy' he could have referred to Feuerbach himself as a representative of a positive philosophy, with especial regard to the standpoint that Feuerbach adopted in an article he wrote for Ruge some eight months later. In this connection, it will be instructive to examine the content of Marx' critical comments. Marx said that the activity of positive philosophy was philosophical introspection, that it regarded philosophy as deficient, that its aim was thoroughly inverted and that form and meaning were contradictory in its tendencies. To what extent these characterised German 'positive philosophy' at that time is highly debatable. (We must certainly not confuse the positivism of French and English philosophy and social science at that time with German thought.) Alternatively, it could be argued that Marx' comments indicate his reaction to a keenly critical evaluation of some of the fundamental premises of Hegel's philosophy that Feuerbach in his article in Ruge's Journal in August 1839, *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie* (see Note 35). In this article, Feuerbach introspectively assessed Hegel's thought, indicating that it was deficient in its derivation and reflection of reality. Marx, still intellectually close to Bauer at this time would certainly have been sharply critical of any attempt by Feuerbach to attack Hegel's thought as an inversion of reality. In 1844, however, by which time he had dissociated himself from Bauer, Marx wrote a *Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole* which strongly echoed the noises that Feuerbach had made in his article of 1839. At the end of 1843, as my paper shows, Marx writes favourably of a practical party a la Feuerbach.

²³ Marx had described Bauer's views as being too abstract in a letter he wrote to Ruge in March 1843. Quoted in D. McLellan *op. cit.*

²⁴ This article was written at the end of 1843 and published in the *Deutsch-franzosische Jahrbucher* February 1844.

²⁵ These quotations are from Karl Marx' *Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* published in A. Ruge *Deutsch-franzosische Jahrbucher* See p. 136 in *Karl Marx Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Trans. A. Jolin and J. O'Malley pp. 131-142 Cambridge 1970.

²⁶ D. McLellan *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought* London 1973.

²⁷ The translators of *Collected Works (English)* have used the phrase "turning towards the outside of philosophy" whereas McLellan uses, "philosophy turning itself against the exterior world" in *Karl Marx: The Early Texts* Oxford 1971.

²⁸ Marx said that Bauer consciously played the part of the World Spirit i.e. God. See K. Marx and F. Engels *The Holy Family* Moscow 1956 p. 116. Marx also described Bauer as "the Critical Saviour of the world" p. 191 *ibid*.

²⁹ See Marx' discussion in *Collected Works (English)* op. cit. Vol. 1 pp. 437-439.

³⁰ See *The Holy Family* op. cit. p. 114.

³¹ See *Collected Works (English)* op. cit. Vol. I p. 438.

³² See *The Holy Family* op. cit. Ch. VI pp. 190-191.

³³ L. Feuerbach *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie* in *Hallische Jahrbucher fur Deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst* Issue No. 208 30th Aug. 1839 pp. 1657 ff.

³⁴ See *MEGA I, i (2)* p. 308. Quoted by McLellan in *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx* op. cit. p. 113. Marx noted that Feuerbach's aphorisms (in the Thesen) talked too much about nature and too little about politics.

³⁵ L. Feuerbach *Briefwechsel und Nachlass* p. 175 ed. K. Grun. Leipzig 1876. Quoted in D. McLellan *ibid.* p. 115.

³⁶ E. Kamenka *The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach* p. 26, London 1970.

³⁷ A. Cornu *The Origins of Marxian Thought* p. 63. Trans. C. Thomas Springfield U.S.A. 1957.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 73.

³⁹ *Collected Works (English)* op. cit. Vol. I pp. 102-105.

⁴⁰ Karl Marx and F. Engels *The Holy Family* op. cit. p. 114. Marx accuses Bauer of being the extreme representative of old Hegelian orthodoxy on pp. 190-191.

⁴¹ *Collected Works (English)* op. cit. Vol. I p. 415.

⁴² Lobkowitz op. cit. p. 222.

⁴³ See *The Holy Family* op. cit. p. 116.

⁴⁴ Karl Marx *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* pp. 175-177 Trans. M. Milligan Ed. D.J. Struick 1967 (1964).

⁴⁵ See *The Holy Family* op. cit. p. 184.

⁴⁶ *Collected Works (English)* op. cit. Vol. 4 p. 137.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 138. Marx quotes Bauer's viewpoint from the latter's *Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker*.

⁴⁸ In *The Holy Family* op. cit. p. 184.

⁴⁹ These quotations are contained in the Foreword to *The Holy Family*.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 116.